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1 Introduction
Traditional epistemic logic can be seen as a particular branch of modal logic. Its semantics
is defined in terms of Kripke models, and philosophical principles about knowledge (e.g. fac-
tivity: Kϕ→ ϕ) are shown to correspond to properties of the epistemic accessibility relation
(e.g. reflexivity). By adding another (doxastic) accessibility relation, also belief can be treated
in this framework. Belief is not assumed to be factive, but at least consistent (¬B⊥), which
corresponds to requiring the doxastic accessibility relation to be serial instead of reflexive. In
this extended framework, one can study the interaction between knowledge and belief (e.g. is
Kϕ → Bϕ a valid principle?); cf. [5, 8]. Furthermore, since this framework is still ‘just’
a (multi-)modal logic, it inherits the mathematically well-developed model theory of modal
logic.
However, it is well-known that dynamic phenomena cannot be captured in this framework;
cf. section 3.1 of [7]. To remedy this, epistemic plausibility models have been introduced (tech-
nical details will be presented later). In these models, one can again study knowledge, belief
(and even other cognitive propositional attitudes), and their various interactions. Further-
more, this framework provides a realistic model of various dynamic phenomena, and thus
solves the main problem of the previous approach. However, because epistemic plausibility
models are much richer structures than Kripke models, they do not straightforwardly inherit
the model-theoretical results of modal logic. Therefore, while epistemic plausibility structures
are well-suited for modeling purposes, an extensive investigation of their model theory has
been lacking so far.
The aim of the present paper is to fill exactly this gap, by initiating a systematic explo-
ration of the model theory of epistemic plausibility models. Like in ‘ordinary’ modal logic, the
focus will be on the notion of bisimulation — it turns out that finding the right generalization
of this notion is not a trivial task. In Section 2, we introduce epistemic plausibility models
and discuss some important operators which can be interpreted on such models, and their
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dynamic behaviour. In Section 3, we define various notions of bisimulations (parametrized by
a language L) and show that L-bisimilarity implies L-equivalence. We establish a Hennesy-
Milner type theorem, and prove two undefinability results — thus shedding some light on
the formal relationships between the various operators that can be interpreted on epistemic
plausibility models. The notion of bisimulation for conditional belief, however, turns out to
be unsatisfactory for several reasons. In Section 4, we discuss these reasons and explore two
possible solutions: adding a modality to the language, and putting extra constraints on the
models. In Section 5, we establish some results about the interaction between bisimulation
and dynamic model changes.
From a broader perspective, this paper can be seen as a reaction against a widespread
trend in the technical modal logic literature (already since the 1960’s), viz. the inclination to
focus almost exclusively on the model theory of ‘classical’ single-quantifier modalities, while
neglecting more-quantifier modalities (which are of central importance for applications in
game theory, AI, philosophy, and linguistics).
Finally, it should be noted that this paper is mainly exploratory in nature. Especially with
respect to the problem of finding bisimulations for conditional belief, the aim is to provide a
(partial) map of the wide landscape of possible solutions, rather than to argue for the ultimate
correctness of one of them.
2 Epistemic plausibility models
We now introduce epistemic plausibility models. Let G be a non-empty set, whose elements
will be called agents. Throughout this paper, we will keep the set of agents fixed, so that it
can almost always be left implicit. Likewise, we assume that Prop is a (countably infinite)
set of proposition letters, which will also be kept fixed throughout the paper.
Definition 1. An epistemic plausibility model is a structureM = 〈W, {∼i}i∈G, {≤i,w}w∈Wi∈G , V 〉,
where W is a non-empty set of states, ∼i⊆W ×W is the epistemic accessibility relation for
agent i, ≤i,w⊆W ×W is the plausibility order for agent i at state w, and V : Prop→ ℘(W )
is a valuation.
As usual, w ∼i v is to be read as: “agent i cannot epistemically distinguish between states
w and v”. We assume this relation to be an equivalence relation. Furthermore, w ≤i,s v is to
be read as: “at state s, agent i considers w at least as plausible as v”. We take this relation
to be a well-founded pre-order.1 Also note that this relation is not only dependent on agents,
but also on states: it is possible for agent i to have different plausibility orderings at different
states (from Section 4 onwards, more constraints will be placed on this state-dependency).
Various epistemic and doxastic notions can be interpreted on epistemic plausibility models.
The three most important ones are: (i) Kiϕ (i knows that ϕ), (ii) B
α
i ϕ (i believes that ϕ,
conditional on α), and (iii) B+i ϕ (i safely believes that ϕ). ‘Normal’ belief can be defined in
terms of conditional belief, by putting Biϕ := B
>
i ϕ.
We abbreviate [w]∼i := {v ∈W |w ∼i v} (the ∼i-equivalence class of state w ∈W ). The
semantics for the notions above can now be stated as follows:
Definition 2. Consider an epistemic plausibility model M and state w; then
1For any state s ∈ W and set X ⊆ W , we define Min≤i,s(X) := {x ∈ X | ∀y ∈ X : y ≤i,s x ⇒ x ≤i,s y}
(the set of ≤i,w-minimal elements of X). That ≤i,s is a well-founded pre-order means that it is reflexive and
transitive, and that for any X ⊆W such that X 6= ∅, also Min≤i,s(X) 6= ∅.
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• M, w |= Kiϕ iff ∀v ∈ [w]∼i :M, v |= ϕ
• M, w |= Bαi ϕ iff ∀v ∈W : v ∈ Min≤i,w([[α]]M ∩ [w]∼i)⇒M, v |= ϕ
• M, w |= B+i ϕ iff ∀v ∈ [w]∼i : v ≤i,w w ⇒M, v |= ϕ
We now turn to the dynamics. In this paper, we will focus on two specific dynamic
phenomena: public announcement (hard information) and radical upgrade (soft information).
Public announcement of a formula ϕ in an epistemic plausibility model M simply removes all
¬ϕ-states from the model. Radical upgrade with ϕ, on the other hand, makes all ϕ-states
more plausible than all ¬ϕ-states, and leaves everything within these two zones untouched.
Formally, this looks as follows:
Definition 3. Consider an epistemic plausibility model M = 〈W, {∼i}i∈G, {≤i,w}w∈Wi∈G , V 〉
and a formula ϕ. We now define the following epistemic plausibility models:
• M!ϕ = 〈W !ϕ, {∼!ϕi }i∈G, {≤!ϕi,w}w∈W
!ϕ
i∈G , V
!ϕ〉, where
– W !ϕ = [[ϕ]]M
– ∼!ϕi :=∼i ∩ ([[ϕ]]M × [[ϕ]]M) for any i ∈ G
– ≤!ϕi,w :=≤i,w ∩ ([[ϕ]]M × [[ϕ]]M) for any i ∈ G and w ∈W !ϕ
– V !ϕ(p) := V (p) ∩ [[ϕ]]M for any p ∈ Prop
• M ⇑ ϕ = 〈W⇑ϕ, {∼⇑ϕi }i∈G, {≤⇑ϕi,w}w∈W
⇑ϕ
i∈G , V
⇑ϕ〉, where
– W⇑ϕ := W
– ∼⇑ϕi :=∼i for any i ∈ G
– ≤⇑ϕi,w :=
( ≤i,w ∩ ([[ϕ]]M × [[ϕ]]M)) ∪ ( ≤i,w ∩ ([[¬ϕ]]M × [[¬ϕ]]M)) ∪ ([[ϕ]]M × [[¬ϕ]]M)
for any i ∈ G and w ∈W⇑ϕ
– V ⇑ϕ(p) := V (p) for any p ∈ Prop
In order to be able to talk about these new models in the object language, we add operators
[!ϕ] and [⇑ ϕ]. Hence, the full language L(K,Bc, B+, !,⇑) has the following Backus-Naur Form
(BNF):2
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | Kiϕ | Bϕi ϕ | B+i ϕ | [A]ϕ
A ::= !ϕ | ⇑ ϕ
We now link up the models and the language by defining the semantics for the two dynamic
modalities. Note that since public announcement is assumed to be truthful, it works with a
precondition; this is not the case for radical upgrade.
Definition 4. Consider an epistemic plausibility model M and state w; then
• M, w |= [!ϕ]ψ iff (if M, w |= ϕ then M!ϕ,w |= ψ)
2Of course, one can also study more restricted languages. BNF’s for such restricted languages can easily
be obtained from the BNF for the full language.
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• M, w |= [⇑ ϕ]ψ iff M ⇑ ϕ,w |= ψ
Finally, dynamic epistemic/doxastic logics are constructed using the well-known modu-
lar approach: (i) one starts by taking (an axiomatization of) some static base logic (in a
sufficiently rich language, so that step (iii) can be done successfully3), (ii) then one adds
dynamic operators to this logic and (iii) finally, one provides a sound set of reduction axioms,
which allow each formula in the dynamic language to be rewritten as an equivalent formula
in the static language. Because of this final step, completeness of the dynamified logic is
reduced to completeness of the static base logic. It also shows that the dynamic language
L(K,Bc, B+, !,⇑) is equally expressive as the static language L(K,Bc, B+).
We illustrate this methodology by providing the most important reduction axioms for pub-
lic announcement and radical upgrade, viz. those in which the epistemic/doxastic operators
are being rewritten:
Fact 5. The following are all sound with respect to epistemic plausibility models:
[!ϕ]Kiψ ↔ (ϕ→ Ki[!ϕ]ψ)
[!ϕ]Bαi ψ ↔ (ϕ→ Bϕ∧[!ϕ]αi [!ϕ]ψ)
[!ϕ]B+i ψ ↔ (ϕ→ B+i [!ϕ]ψ)
[⇑ ϕ]Kiψ ↔ Ki[⇑ ϕ]ψ
[⇑ ϕ]Bαi ψ ↔
(
Kˆi(ϕ ∧ [⇑ ϕ]α) ∧Bϕ∧[⇑ϕ]αi [⇑ ϕ]ψ
)∨(¬Kˆi(ϕ ∧ [⇑ ϕ]α) ∧B[⇑ϕ]αi [⇑ ϕ]ψ)
[⇑ ϕ]B+i ψ ↔
(
ϕ→ B+i (ϕ→ [⇑ ϕ]ψ)
)∧(¬ϕ→ (B+i (¬ϕ→ [⇑ ϕ]ψ) ∧Ki(ϕ→ [⇑ ϕ]ψ)))
3 Bisimulation for epistemic plausibility models
We now start our investigation of the model theory of epistemic plausibility models. The
focus will be on the notion of bisimulation, which is also central in the model theory of
Kripke models. Since we want to explore bisimulation for various languages, we make it into
a parametrized notion, so that each language has its own notion of bisimulation, which ‘does
what it needs to do, and nothing more’.
Below are the definitions of K-bisimulation, B+-bisimulation and Bc-bisimulation. Since
Ki is just the universal modality for ∼i, the notion of K-bisimulation is that of regular bisim-
ulation from modal logic. The notion of B+-bisimulation is a straightforward generalization.
The notion of Bc-bisimulation, however, is much more intricate, since it involves universally
quantifying over all formulas of the language L(B+). We will return to this issue in later
sections.
Definition 6. Given epistemic plausiblity modelsM = 〈W, {∼i}i∈G, {≤i,w}w∈Wi∈G , V 〉 andM′ =
〈W ′, {∼′i}i∈G, {≤′i,w′}w
′∈W ′
i∈G , V
′〉 ; a relation Z ⊆W ×W ′ is a K-bisimulation iff
• if (w,w′) ∈ Z, then for all atoms p: w ∈ V (p)⇔ w′ ∈ V ′(p)
• if (w,w′) ∈ Z and w ∼i v, then there is a v′ ∈W ′ such that (v, v′) ∈ Z and w′ ∼′i v′
• if (w,w′) ∈ Z and w′ ∼′i v′, then there is a v ∈W such that (v, v′) ∈ Z and w ∼i v
3For example, if the language contains radical upgrade and safe belief operators, then it should also contain
the knowledge operator, so that the reduction axiom is expressible; cf. Fact 5.
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Definition 7. Given epistemic plausiblity modelsM = 〈W, {∼i}i∈G, {≤i,w}w∈Wi∈G , V 〉 andM′ =
〈W ′, {∼′i}i∈G, {≤′i,w′}w
′∈W ′
i∈G , V
′〉 ; a relation Z ⊆W ×W ′ is a B+-bisimulation iff
• if (w,w′) ∈ Z, then for all atoms p: w ∈ V (p)⇔ w′ ∈ V ′(p)
• if (w,w′) ∈ Z and w ∼i v and v ≤i,w w, then there is a v′ ∈ W ′ such that (v, v′) ∈ Z
and w′ ∼′i v′ and v′ ≤′i,w′ w′
• if (w,w′) ∈ Z and w′ ∼′i v′ and v′ ≤′i,w′ w′, then there is a v ∈ W such that (v, v′) ∈ Z
and w ∼i v and v ≤i,w w
Definition 8. Given epistemic plausiblity modelsM = 〈W, {∼i}i∈G, {≤i,w}w∈Wi∈G , V 〉 andM′ =
〈W ′, {∼′i}i∈G, {≤′i,w′}w
′∈W ′
i∈G , V
′〉 ; a relation Z ⊆W ×W ′ is a Bc-bisimulation iff
• if (w,w′) ∈ Z, then for all atoms p: w ∈ V (p)⇔ w′ ∈ V ′(p)
• for all formulas α ∈ L(Bc): if (w,w′) ∈ Z and v ∈ Min≤i,w([[α]]M ∩ [w]∼i), then there is
a v′ ∈W ′ such that (v, v′) ∈ Z and v′ ∈ Min≤′
i,w′
([[α]]M
′ ∩ [w′]∼′i)
• for all formulas α ∈ L(Bc): if (w,w′) ∈ Z and v′ ∈ Min≤′
i,w′
([[α]]M
′ ∩ [w′]∼′i), then there
is a v ∈W such that (v, v′) ∈ Z and v ∈ Min≤i,w([[α]]M ∩ [w]∼i)
The following theorem shows that these are the ‘right’ notions, since they allow us to
establish a characteristic feature of bisimulation: bisimilarity implies modal equivalence.
Theorem 9. Consider two epistemic plausiblity models M = 〈W, {∼i}i∈G, {≤i,w}w∈Wi∈G , V 〉
and M′ = 〈W ′, {∼′i}i∈G, {≤′i,w′}w
′∈W ′
i∈G , V
′〉, and a relation Z ⊆W ×W ′.
1. If Z is a K-bisimulation, then for all ϕ ∈ L(K) and for all (w,w′) ∈ Z, it holds that
M, w |= ϕ⇔M′, w′ |= ϕ.
2. If Z is a B+-bisimulation, then for all ϕ ∈ L(B+) and for all (w,w′) ∈ Z, it holds that
M, w |= ϕ⇔M′, w′ |= ϕ.
3. If Z is a Bc-bisimulation, then for all ϕ ∈ L(Bc) and for all (w,w′) ∈ Z, it holds that
M, w |= ϕ⇔M′, w′ |= ϕ.
Proof. Each of these three statements is easily proved by induction on the complexity of ϕ.
To illustrate this, we treat the cases for the epistemic/doxastic modality.
1. Suppose that (w,w′) ∈ Z and M, w |= Kiϕ; we show that also M′, w′ |= Kiϕ. Consider
an arbitrary v′ ∈ W ′ and suppose that w′ ∼′i v′. By Definition 6, there exists a v ∈ W
such that (v, v′) ∈ Z and w ∼i v. Since M, w |= Kiϕ and w ∼i v, we get M, v |= ϕ. Since
(v, v′) ∈ Z, we get by the induction hypothesis that also M′, v′ |= ϕ. The other direction is
completely analogous.
2. Suppose that (w,w′) ∈ Z andM, w |= B+i ϕ; we show that alsoM′, w′ |= B+i ϕ. Consider
an arbitrary v′ ∈W ′ and suppose that w′ ∼′i v′ and v′ ≤′i,w′ w′. By Definition 7, there exists
a v ∈ W such that (v, v′) ∈ Z and w ∼i v and v ≤i,w w. Since M, w |= B+i ϕ and w ∼i v and
v ≤i,w w, we get M, v |= ϕ. Since (v, v′) ∈ Z, we get by the induction hypothesis that also
M′, v′ |= ϕ. The other direction is completely analogous.
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3. Suppose that (w,w′) ∈ Z andM, w |= Bαi ϕ; we show that alsoM′, w′ |= Bαi ϕ. Consider
an arbitrary v′ ∈ W ′ and suppose that v′ ∈ Min≤′
i,w′
([[α]]M
′ ∩ [w′]∼′i). Since Bαi ϕ ∈ L(Bc),
also α ∈ L(Bc); hence, by Definition 8, there exists a v ∈ W such that (v, v′) ∈ Z and
v ∈ Min≤i,w([[α]]M ∩ [w]∼i). Since M, w |= Bαi ϕ and v ∈ Min≤i,w([[α]]M ∩ [w]∼i), we get
M, v |= ϕ. Since (v, v′) ∈ Z, we get by the induction hypothesis that also M′, v′ |= ϕ. The
other direction is completely analogous.
Using these separate notions of bisimulations, we can now introduce bisimulations for
languages which have more than just one of the operators K/B+/Bc in a modular way
(although conditional belief complicates matters a little bit). Obviously, these combined
notions lead to results analogous to Theorem 9; we state just two of these (without proof) as
Theorem 11, for future reference.
Definition 10. Consider epistemic plausiblity models M = 〈W, {∼i}i∈G, {≤i,w}w∈Wi∈G , V 〉 and
M′ = 〈W ′, {∼′i}i∈G, {≤′i,w′}w
′∈W ′
i∈G , V
′〉 and a relation Z ⊆W ×W ′.
• Z is a {K,B+}-bisimulation iff Z is a K-bisimulation and a B+-bisimulation
• Z is a {K,Bc}-bisimulation iff Z is a K-bisimulation and a Bc-bisimulation, with the
universal quantifiers in Definition 8 ranging over L(K,Bc) (instead of just over L(Bc))
• Z is a {K,B+, Bc}-bisimulation iff Z is a K-bisimulation, a B+-bisimulation, and a Bc-
bisimulation, with the universal quantifiers in Definition 8 ranging over L(K,B+, Bc)
(instead of just over L(Bc))
Theorem 11. Consider two epistemic plausiblity models M = 〈W, {∼i}i∈G, {≤i,w}w∈Wi∈G , V 〉
and M′ = 〈W ′, {∼′i}i∈G, {≤′i,w′}w
′∈W ′
i∈G , V
′〉, and a relation Z ⊆W ×W ′.
1. If Z is a {K,Bc}-bisimulation, then for all ϕ ∈ L(K,Bc) and for all (w,w′) ∈ Z, it
holds that M, w |= ϕ⇔M′, w′ |= ϕ.
2. If Z is a {K,B+}-bisimulation, then for all ϕ ∈ L(K,B+) and for all (w,w′) ∈ Z, it
holds that M, w |= ϕ⇔M′, w′ |= ϕ.
One can also wonder about the converse direction of theorems such as Theorem 11: if
M, w |= ϕ ⇔ M′, w′ |= ϕ for all ϕ ∈ L(K,Bc), then is there always a {K,Bc}-bisimulation
Z ⊆W ×W ′ such that (w,w′) ∈ Z? One of the main results from the model theory of basic
modal logic, viz. the Hennesy-Milner theorem (cf. [2], Theorem 2.24) says that this question
can be answered positively, at least when the models are assumed to be image-finite. This
theorem can easily be generalized to epistemic plausibility models:
Definition 12. Consider an epistemic plausibility model M = 〈W, {∼i}i∈G, {≤i,w}w∈Wi∈G , V 〉.
We say that M is image-finite if for all i ∈ G and all w ∈W , the set [w]∼i is finite.
Theorem 13. Consider two image-finite models M = 〈W, {∼i}i∈G, {≤i,w}w∈Wi∈G , V 〉 and M′ =
〈W ′, {∼′i}i∈G, {≤′i,w′}w
′∈W ′
i∈G , V
′〉. Then for all states w ∈ W and w′ ∈ W ′, if M, w |= ϕ ⇔
M′, w′ |= ϕ for all ϕ ∈ L(K,Bc) (we will write w ≡{K,Bc} w′), then w and w′ are {K,Bc}-
bisimilar.
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Proof. We use the trick of the Hennessy-Milner theorem for basic modal logic, viz. we show
that ≡{K,Bc} is itself a {K,Bc}-bisimulation. If w ≡{K,Bc} w′, then the atoms clause is
trivially fulfilled. We now focus on the zig-clauses of Definitions 6 and 8 (extended to L(K,Bc)
instead of just L(Bc), cf. supra); the zag-clauses are treated completely analogously.
Zig-clause for K-bisimulation. Suppose that w ≡{K,Bc} w′ and w ∼i v; we will show that
there is a v′ ∈ W ′ such that v ≡{K,Bc} v′ and w′ ∼′i v′. For a reductio, suppose that this is
not the case; so for all v′ ∈ [w′]∼′i we have v 6≡{K,Bc} v′ (∗). If [w′]∼′i = ∅, then M′, w′ |= Ki⊥,
so since w ≡{K,Bc} w′, we get M, w |= Ki⊥, which contradicts v ∈ [w]∼i . Hence [w′]∼′i 6= ∅.
SinceM′ is image-finite, [w′]∼′i is finite, say [w
′]∼′i = {v′1, . . . , v′n}. We can now rephrase (∗) as
follows: for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there is a ϕk ∈ L(K,Bc) such that M, v |= ϕk and M′, v′k 6|= ϕk.
It now easily follows that M, w |= ¬Ki¬(ϕ1∧ · · ·∧ϕn), and yet M′, w′ 6|= ¬Ki¬(ϕ1∧ · · ·∧ϕn).
Since ϕ1, . . . , ϕn ∈ L(K,Bc), also ¬Ki¬(ϕ1∧· · ·∧ϕn) ∈ L(K,Bc). This contradicts w ≡{K,Bc}
w′.
Zig-clause for Bc-bisimulation. Consider an arbitrary formula α ∈ L(K,Bc) and suppose
that w ≡{K,Bc} w′ and v ∈ Min≤i,w([[α]]M ∩ [w]∼i). We will now show that there is a v′ ∈W ′
such that v ≡{K,Bc} v′ and v′ ∈ Min≤′
i,w′
([[α]]M
′ ∩ [w′]∼′i). For a reductio, suppose that
this is not the case; so for all v′ ∈ Min≤′
i,w′
([[α]]M
′ ∩ [w′]∼′i) we have v 6≡{K,Bc} v′ (∗∗). If
Min≤′
i,w′
([[α]]M
′∩ [w′]∼′i) = ∅, thenM′, w′ |= Bαi ⊥, so since w ≡{K,Bc} w′, we getM, w |= Bαi ⊥,
which contradicts v ∈ Min≤i,w([[α]]M∩ [w]∼i). Hence Min≤′
i,w′
([[α]]M
′ ∩ [w′]∼′i) 6= ∅. Since M′ is
image-finite, [w′]∼′i is finite, so [[α]]
M′ ∩ [w′]∼′i is also finite, and so Min≤′i,w′ ([[α]]
M′ ∩ [w′]∼′i) is
also finite — say Min≤′
i,w′
([[α]]M
′∩[w′]∼′i) = {v′1, . . . , v′m}. We can now rephrase (∗∗) as follows:
for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, there is a ϕk ∈ L(K,Bc) such that M, v |= ϕk and M′, v′k 6|= ϕk. It
now easily follows that M, w |= ¬Bαi ¬(ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ϕm), and yet M′, w′ 6|= ¬Bαi ¬(ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ϕm).
Since α,ϕ1, . . . , ϕm ∈ L(K,Bc), also ¬Bαi ¬(ϕ1 ∧ · · · ∧ ϕm) ∈ L(K,Bc). This contradicts
w ≡{K,Bc} w′.
One of the main uses of bisimulation is studying (un)definability results. We will now
illustrate this by proving two undefinability theorems. Both of these theorems can be seen as
tying up some loose ends, in the sense that the results were expected, but not yet explicitly
proved in the existing literature.
Theorem 14. Conditional belief cannot be defined in terms of knowledge and safe belief.4
Proof. For a reductio, suppose conditional belief is definable in terms of knowledge and safe
belief. Consider the formula Bpq. Since conditional belief is definable in terms of K and B+,
there is a formula ϕ ∈ L(K,B+) such that M, w |= Bpq ↔ ϕ for all epistemic plausibility
models M and states w.
Now consider the models M and M′ pictured below (we focus on one agent i, and drop
agent subscripts for the sake of readability). It is easy to check that the dotted line Z is
a {K,B+}-bisimulation. Since ϕ ∈ L(K,B+), it follows by Theorem 9 that M, w |= ϕ iff
M′, w′ |= ϕ, and hence also M, w |= Bpq iff M′, w′ |= Bpq.
4This theorem does not contradict Theorem 27, since that definability theorem holds for a restricted class
of epistemic plausibility models, whereas this undefinability theorem holds for the entire class of epistemic
plausibility models; also note that the ‘counterexample models’ used to prove this theorem do not belong to
the restricted class of Theorem 27.
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Since w 6≤w v and v 6≤w w, we have w, v ∈ Min≤w{w, v}, and hence Min≤w([[p]]M ∩ [w]∼) =
Min≤w{w, v} = {w, v}. Analogously Min≤′
w′
([[p]]M
′ ∩ [w′]∼′) = {w′, v′}. Since M, w |= q and
M, v |= q, we get M, w |= Bpq, but since M′, v′ 6|= q, we get M′, w′ 6|= Bpq; contradiction.
Theorem 15. Safe belief cannot be defined in terms of knowledge and conditional belief.
Proof. For a reductio, suppose safe belief is definable in terms of knowledge and conditional
belief. Consider the formula B+p. Since safe belief is definable in terms of knowledge and
conditional belief, there is a formula ϕ ∈ L(K,Bc) such that M, w |= B+p ↔ ϕ for all
epistemic plausibility models M and states w.
Now consider the models M and M′ pictured below (we focus on one agent i, and drop
agent subscripts for the sake of readability). It is easy to check that the dotted lines Z form a
K-bisimulation. We claim that they also form a Bc-bisimulation (this claim is proved later).
Since ϕ ∈ L(K,Bc), it follows by the first part of Theorem 11 that M, w |= ϕ iff M′, w′ |= ϕ,
and hence also M, w |= B+p iff M′, w′ |= B+p. However, using Definition 2, one easily checks
that M, w |= B+p, while M′, w′ 6|= B+p; contradiction.
We now prove the claim that Z is a bisimulation. Note that for any x ∈ {w, v} and
X ⊆ {w, v}, it holds that Min≤x(X) = X and [x]∼ = {w, v}.5 Hence we get that y ∈
Min≤x([[α]]M ∩ [x]∼) iff y ∈ [[α]]M ∩ [x]∼ iff M, y |= α. Analogously, we show that y′ ∈
Min≤′
x′
([[α]]M
′ ∩ [x′]∼′) iff M′, y′ |= α. We already know that w and w′, and v and v′ agree on
all atoms. Hence, reconsidering Definition 8, the following remains to be shown:
∀α ∈ L(K,Bc) : if (x, x′) ∈ Z and M, y |= α, then ∃y′ ∈W ′ : (y, y′) ∈ Z and M′, y′ |= α
∀α ∈ L(K,Bc) : if (x, x′) ∈ Z and M′, y′ |= α, then ∃y ∈W : (y, y′) ∈ Z and M, y |= α
Note that the condition (x, x′) ∈ Z is vacuous. Furthermore, since Z = {(w,w′), (v, v′)},
this can be rewritten as the following
Claim. ∀α ∈ L(K,Bc) :M, w |= α⇔M′, w′ |= α and M, v |= α⇔M′, v′ |= α
This claim is easily proved by induction on the complexity of α. We treat the cases for
knowledge and conditional belief. If α = Kϕ, then we have:
5Although this is not explicitly represented in the picture, we are assuming that ≤v= {(w,w), (v, v)} and
≤v′= {(w′, w′), (v′, v′)}.
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M, w |= Kϕ ⇔ ∀x ∈ [w]∼ :M, x |= ϕ
⇔ M, w |= ϕ and M, v |= ϕ
⇔ M′, w′ |= ϕ and M′, v′ |= ϕ (IH)
⇔ ∀x′ ∈ [w′]∼′ :M′, x′ |= ϕ
⇔ M′, w′ |= Kϕ
and similarly M, v |= Kϕ⇔M′, v′ |= Kϕ. If α = Bψϕ, then we have:
M, w |= Bψϕ ⇔ ∀x ∈ Min≤w([[ψ]]M ∩ [w]∼) :M, x |= ϕ
⇔ ∀x ∈ [[ψ]]M :M, x |= ϕ (cf. supra)
⇔ ∀x ∈W :M, x |= ψ ⇒M, x |= ϕ
⇔ M, w |= ψ ⇒M, w |= ϕ and M, v |= ψ ⇒M, v |= ϕ
⇔ M′, w′ |= ψ ⇒M′, w′ |= ϕ and M′, v′ |= ψ ⇒M′, v′ |= ϕ (IH)
⇔ ∀x′ ∈W ′ :M′, x′ |= ψ ⇒M′, x′ |= ϕ
⇔ ∀x′ ∈ [[ψ]]M′ :M′, x′ |= ϕ
⇔ ∀x′ ∈ Min≤′
w′
([[ψ]]M
′ ∩ [w′]∼′) :M′, x′ |= ϕ (cf. supra)
⇔ M, w |= Bψϕ
and similarly M, v |= Bψϕ⇔M′, v′ |= Bψϕ (recall Footnote 5). This finishes the proof of the
claim, and thus also of Theorem 15.
4 Structural bisimulations
We already noted in the previous section that the notion of Bc-bisimulation introduced in
Definition 8 is much more intricate than the other notions. We will now argue that this
definition is unsatisfactory for both theoretical and practical reasons.
On the theoretical level, since Definition 8 involves universal quantification over L(Bc),
it is not strictly structural. Rather than stating conditions on ∼i and ≤i,w (as is done in
Definitions 6 and 7 of bisimulations for knowledge and safe belief), it essentially involves
truth sets of (arbitrary) formulas. A related issue is that this definition of bisimilarity for
models cannot be turned into a definition of bisimilarity for frames by simply dropping the
‘atoms’ clause (as can be done with Definitions 6 and 7): it depends on truth sets of formulas
([[α]]M and [[α]]M
′
), and thus also on the concrete valuations of the models M and M′.
Practically speaking, Definition 8 makes it often very difficult to prove that two given
epistemic plausibility models are actually Bc-bisimilar. In the appendix of [4], induction on
the complexity of α (with a cleverly strengthened induction hypothesis) is used to establish
that the zig- and zag-conditions of Definition 8 hold for all formulas α. However, this ap-
proach is geared towards proving one particular Bc-bisimilarity result (about two artificially
crafted models), and cannot easily be generalized to the general case (proving Bc-bisimilarity
of arbitrary models). Similar remarks apply to our proof of Theorem 15. Furthermore, re-
call that one of the main goals of introducing bisimulations is that they allow us to prove
equivalence results. For example, in Theorem 15, we want to show that the two pictured
models are {K,Bc}-bisimilar, and then (using the first part of Theorem 11) conclude that
they are L(K,Bc)-equivalent. However, note that while establishing the Bc-bisimilarity, we
ended up proving a separate claim, which just is the original L(K,Bc)-equivalence result we
were looking for. This seems to be some kind of practical ‘circularity’ (we want bisimilarity
to get equivalence — but to get bisimilarity, we already need equivalence), which renders the
current notion of Bc-bisimulation practically useless.
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We will now propose two different solutions to this problem, and explore and compare their
advantages and disadvantages. Both solutions involve reducing conditional belief to other
modalities which have more standard notions of bisimulation. The first approach involves
both extending the language and putting some mild constraints on the epistemic plausibility
models. The second approach puts more heavy constraints on the models, but does not need
to extend the language. Both solutions have in common that we end up only needing fully
structural notions of bisimulation, without any universal quantification over formulas.
4.1 Adding a new modality
The first approach6 combines language engineering and putting some mild constraints on the
models. These constraints are captured by the following definition:
Definition 16. An epistemic plausibility model M = 〈W, {∼i}i∈G, {≤i,w}w∈Wi∈G , V 〉 is called
uniform iff the plausibility relations are uniform within epistemic equivalence classes, i.e. iff
for any i ∈ G and w, v ∈W : if w ∼i v then ≤i,w =≤i,v.
This is a natural condition to impose on epistemic plausibility models: it leads to the (in-
tuitively plausible) epistemic/doxastic introspection principle that agents know their (condi-
tional) beliefs. Furthermore, uniformity is a dynamically robust notion, in the sense that if
an epistemic plausibility model is uniform, then after it has undergone some dynamics, it is
still uniform.
Theorem 17. If an epistemic plausibility model M is uniform, then M |= Bαi ϕ→ KiBαi ϕ.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary state w of M and suppose that M, w |= Bαi ϕ. Consider an
arbitrary v ∈ [w]∼i ; it now suffices to show that M, v |= Bαi ϕ. Since M, w |= Bαi ϕ, we
have Min≤i,w([[α]]M ∩ [w]∼i) ⊆ [[ϕ]]M (†). Since w ∼i v, we have [w]∼i = [v]∼i (because
∼i is an equivalence relation) and ≤i,w =≤i,v (because M is uniform). Hence (†) becomes:
Min≤i,v([[α]]M ∩ [v]∼i) ⊆ [[ϕ]]M, ergo M, v |= Bαi ϕ.
Theorem 18. If an epistemic plausibility model M is uniform, then so are M!ϕ and M ⇑ ϕ.
Proof. Consider a uniform model M. We treat the case of public announcement. Consider
arbitrary states w, v of M!ϕ and suppose that w ∼!ϕi v. By Definition 3, we get that w ∼i v.
Since M is uniform, it follows that ≤i,w =≤i,v. Hence also ≤!ϕi,w =≤i,w ∩([[ϕ]]M × [[ϕ]]M) =
≤i,v ∩([[ϕ]]M × [[ϕ]]M) =≤!ϕi,v. The case of radical upgrade is completely analogous.
Uniform epistemic plausibility models will become very important later on. First, however,
we need to set up some other things. For any agent i ∈ G and state w in a plausibility model,
let us abbreviate <i,w :=≤i,w − ≥i,w and ∼=i,w :=≤i,w ∩ ≥i,w (so x <i,w y iff x ≤i,w y and
not y ≤i,w x; and x ∼=i,w y iff x ≤i,w y and y ≤i,w x). Note that since ≤i,w is a pre-order and
thus not necessarily antisymmetric, it is possible that x ∼=i,w y and yet x 6= y. One can easily
verify the following fact, which expresses minimality in terms of the strict ordering <:
Fact 19. Consider an epistemic plausibility model M = 〈W, {∼i}i∈G, {≤i,w}w∈Wi∈G , V 〉, a set
X ⊆ W and a state w ∈ W . Then for any state x ∈ W , it holds that x ∈ Min≤i,w(X) iff
x ∈ X and there is no y ∈ X such that y <i,w x.
6This approach is based on a suggestion by Johan van Benthem and Davide Grossi.
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We now extend our language with a modality [>i] to talk about this strict version of the
plausibility order. As in Definition 2, the semantics for this modality is relativized to the
epistemic equivalence classes:
Definition 20. Consider an epistemic plausibility model M and state w; then
M, w |= [>i]ϕ iff ∀v ∈ [w]∼i : v <i,w w ⇒M, v |= ϕ
We now show that adding this new modality [>i] as a primitive operator is justified, in
the sense that it cannot be defined in even the richest language of the previous section:
Theorem 21. The modality [>i] cannot be defined in L(K,Bc, B+).
Proof. We focus on one agent i, and drop agent subscripts for the sake of readability. Consider
the models pictured below (we assume that all proposition letters are made true everywhere:
V (p) = {w, v}, V ′(p) = {w′, v′} for all p ∈ Prop).
We first prove an auxiliary claim about the right model M′:
Auxiliary claim. For all ϕ ∈ L(K,Bc, B+), we have M′, w′ |= ϕ iff M′, v′ |= ϕ.
Proof of auxiliary claim. We prove this by induction on the complexity of ϕ. The base case,
for proposition letters p, is true because V ′(p) = {w′, v′} for all p ∈ Prop. The Boolean cases
are trivial. We now focus on the three epistemic/doxastic operators:
• ϕ = Kψ. Since [w′]∼′ = {w′, v′} = [v′]∼′ , we have: M′, w′ |= Kψ iff (M′, w′ |=
ψ & M′, v′ |= ψ) iff M′, v′ |= Kψ.
• ϕ = B+ψ. Since [w′]∼′ = {w′, v′} = [v′]∼′ and ≤′w′ = {w′, v′} × {w′, v′} =≤′v′ , we have:
M′, w′ |= B+ψ iff (M′, w′ |= ψ & M′, v′ |= ψ) iff M′, v′ |= B+ψ.
• ϕ = Bαψ. Since [w′]∼′ = [v′]∼′ and≤′w′ =≤′v′ , we have: M′, w′ |= Bαψ iff Min≤′w′ ([[α]]
M′∩
[w′]∼′) ⊆ [[ψ]]M′ iff Min≤′
v′
([[α]]M
′ ∩ [v′]∼′) ⊆ [[ψ]]M′ iff M′, v′ |= Bαψ.
This finishes the proof of the auxiliary claim about M′. We now use this to prove that M
and M′ are statewise L(K,B+, Bc)-equivalent:
∀ϕ ∈ L(K,B+, Bc) : (M, w |= ϕ⇔M′, w′ |= ϕ) and (M, v |= ϕ⇔M′, v′ |= ϕ)
We prove this again by induction on the complexity of ϕ. The base case holds because
V (p) = {w, v} and V ′(p) = {w′, v′} for all p ∈ Prop. The Boolean cases are trivial. We now
focus on the three epistemic/doxastic operators:
• ϕ = Kψ
Since [w]∼ = {w, v} and [w′]∼′ = {w′, v′}, we have
M, w |= Kψ ⇔ (M, w |= ψ and M, v |= ψ)
⇔ (M′, w′ |= ψ and M′, v′ |= ψ) (induction hypothesis)
⇔ M′, w′ |= Kψ
Analogously we prove that M, v |= Kψ iff M′, v′ |= Kψ
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• ϕ = B+ψ
Since ∀x ∈ W : x ≤w w ⇔ x ∈ {w, v} and ∀x′ ∈ W ′ : x ≤′w′ w′ ⇔ x′ ∈ {w′, v′} (and
[w]∼ = {w, v} and [w′]∼′ = {w′, v′}), we have
M, w |= B+ψ ⇔ (M, w |= ψ and M, v |= ψ)
⇔ (M′, w′ |= ψ and M′, v′ |= ψ) (induction hypothesis)
⇔ M′, w′ |= B+ψ
Since ∀x ∈ W : x ≤v v ⇔ x = v and ∀x′ ∈ W ′ : x ≤′v′ v′ ⇔ x′ ∈ {w′, v′} (and
[v]∼ = {w, v} and [v′]∼′ = {w′, v′}), we have
M, v |= B+ψ ⇔ M, v |= ψ
⇔ M′, v′ |= ψ (induction hypothesis)
⇔ (M′, w′ |= ψ and M′, v′ |= ψ) (auxiliary claim)
⇔ M′, v′ |= B+ψ
• ϕ = Bαψ
We make a case distinction:
Case A v ∈ [[α]]M
Then by IH: M′, v′ |= α. By the auxiliary claim also M′, w′ |= α, so [[α]]M′ =
{w′, v′}. Since v′ ∼=′w′ w′ and [w′]∼′ = {w′, v′} we get that Min≤′w′ ([[α]]
M′∩ [w′]∼′) =
{w′, v′}. Furthermore, sinceM, v |= α and v <w w, we have Min≤w([[α]]M∩ [w]∼) =
{v}. Hence we have
M, w |= Bαψ ⇔ Min≤w([[α]]M ∩ [w]∼) ⊆ [[ψ]]M
⇔ {v} ⊆ [[ψ]]M
⇔ M, v |= ψ
⇔ M′, v′ |= ψ (induction hypothesis)
⇔ (M′, w′ |= ψ and M′, v′ |= ψ) (auxiliary claim)
⇔ {w′, v′} ⊆ [[ψ]]M′
⇔ Min≤′
w′
([[α]]M
′ ∩ [w′]∼′) ⊆ [[ψ]]M′
⇔ M′, w′ |= Bαψ
Analogously we prove that M, v |= Bαψ iff M′, v′ |= Bαψ.
Case B v /∈ [[α]]M
Then by IH: M′, v′ 6|= α. By the auxiliary claim, we get M′, w′ 6|= α. By IH again,
we get M, w 6|= α. Now we have [[α]]M = ∅ = [[α]]M′ , and thus
M, w |= Bαψ ⇔ Min≤w([[α]]M ∩ [w]∼) ⊆ [[ψ]]M
⇔ Min≤w(∅) ⊆ [[ψ]]M
⇔ ∅ ⊆ [[ψ]]M
⇔ ∅ ⊆ [[ψ]]M′
⇔ Min≤′
w′
(∅) ⊆ [[ψ]]M′
⇔ Min≤′
w′
([[α]]M
′ ∩ [w′]∼′) ⊆ [[ψ]]M′
⇔ M′, w′ |= Bαψ
Analogously we prove that M, v |= Bαψ iff M′, v′ |= Bαψ.
We have now shown that for all ϕ ∈ L(K,B+, Bc), we have M, w |= ϕ iff M′, w′ |= ϕ. Yet
one easily verifies that M, w |= 〈>〉>, while M′, w′ 6|= 〈>〉> (where, of course, 〈>〉 = ¬[>]¬).
Hence, [>i] is not definable in L(K,B+, Bc).
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The [>]-modality is actually so expressive that, together with the knowledge operator, it
is able to define the notion of conditional belief — at least, when we restrict ourselves to the
uniform epistemic plausibility models introduced at the beginning of this subsection.
Theorem 22. For all uniform models M, it holds that M |= Bαi ϕ↔ Ki((α ∧ ¬〈>i〉α)→ ϕ).
Proof. Consider an arbitrary uniform model M and a state w of M. Note that for any
x ∈ [w]∼i , it holds that [w]∼i = [x]∼i (since ∼i is an equivalence relation) and that ≤i,w =≤i,x
(since M is uniform). This justifies step (‡) below:
M, w |= Bαi ϕ
⇔ ∀x ∈W : x ∈ Min≤i,w([[α]]M ∩ [w]∼i)⇒M, x |= ϕ
⇔ ∀x ∈W : (x ∈ [[α]]M ∩ [w]∼i and ¬∃y ∈ [[α]]M ∩ [w]∼i : y <i,w x)⇒M, x |= ϕ (Fact 19)
⇔ ∀x ∈ [w]∼i : (M, x |= α and ¬∃y ∈ [w]∼i : (y <i,w x and M, y |= α))⇒M, x |= ϕ
⇔ ∀x ∈ [w]∼i : (M, x |= α and ¬∃y ∈ [x]∼i : (y <i,x x and M, y |= α))⇒M, x |= ϕ (‡)
⇔ ∀x ∈ [w]∼i : (M, x |= α and M, x 6|= 〈>i〉α)⇒M, x |= ϕ
⇔ M, w |= Ki((α ∧ ¬〈>i〉α)→ ϕ)
We now introduce the notion of [>]-bisimilarity, which — as desired — is fully structural:
Definition 23. Given epistemic plausiblity models M = 〈W, {∼i}i∈G, {≤i,w}w∈Wi∈G , V 〉 and
M′ = 〈W ′, {∼′i}i∈G, {≤′i,w′}w
′∈W ′
i∈G , V
′〉 ; a relation Z ⊆W ×W ′ is a [>]-bisimulation iff
• if (w,w′) ∈ Z, then for all atoms p: w ∈ V (p)⇔ w′ ∈ V ′(p)
• if (w,w′) ∈ Z and w ∼i v and v <i,w w, then there is a v′ ∈ W ′ such that (v, v′) ∈ Z
and w′ ∼′i v′ and v′ <′i,w′ w′
• if (w,w′) ∈ Z and w′ ∼′i v′ and v′ <′i,w′ w′, then there is a v ∈ W such that (v, v′) ∈ Z
and w ∼i v and v <i,w w
Part 1 of Theorem 24 shows that this is the right notion of bisimulation. Furthermore, we
get combined notions of bisimulation in the obvious way. In particular, {K, [>]}-bisimulations
are combined K- and [>]-bisimulations; since both of the latter notions are purely structural,
also {K, [>]}-bisimulation is structural. Part 2 of Theorem 24 is the analogue of part 1 for this
combined notion. Most importantly, part 3 states that when we restrict ourselves to the class
of uniform models, we can get equivalence for conditional belief7 by means of a structural
notion of bisimulation. Finally, part 4 says that if we restrict to uniform image-finite models,
then (structural) {K, [>]}-bisimilarity implies {K,Bc}-bisimilarity (which involves universal
quantification over formulas).
Theorem 24. Consider two epistemic plausiblity models M = 〈W, {∼i}i∈G, {≤i,w}w∈Wi∈G , V 〉
and M′ = 〈W ′, {∼′i}i∈G, {≤′i,w′}w
′∈W ′
i∈G , V
′〉, and a relation Z ⊆W ×W ′.
1. If Z is a [>]-bisimulation, then for all ϕ ∈ L([>]) and for all (w,w′) ∈ Z, it holds that
M, w |= ϕ⇔M′, w′ |= ϕ.
7Actually for L(K,Bc) — but this is no heavy restriction, since it is natural to study both notions simul-
taneously anyway.
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2. If Z is a {K, [>]}-bisimulation, then for all ϕ ∈ L(K, [>]) and for all (w,w′) ∈ Z, it
holds that M, w |= ϕ⇔M′, w′ |= ϕ.
3. If M and M′ are uniform, and Z is a {K, [>]}-bisimulation, then for all ϕ ∈ L(K,Bc)
and for all (w,w′) ∈ Z, it holds that M, w |= ϕ⇔M′, w′ |= ϕ.
4. If M and M′ are uniform and image-finite, then for any states w ∈W and w′ ∈W ′, we
have that if w and w′ are {K, [>]}-bisimilar, then they are {K,Bc}-bisimilar as well.
Proof. 1. This is easily proved by induction on the complexity of ϕ. We only treat the case
for [>i]. Suppose that (w,w
′) ∈ Z and M, w |= [>i]ϕ; we show that also M′, w′ |= [>i]ϕ.
Consider an arbitrary v′ ∈ W ′ and suppose that w′ ∼′i v′ and v′ <′i,w′ w′. By Definition 23,
there exists a v ∈W such that (v, v′) ∈ Z and w ∼i v and v <i,w w. Since M, w |= [>i]ϕ and
w ∼i v and v <i,w w, we get M, v |= ϕ. Since (v, v′) ∈ Z, we get by the induction hypothesis
that also M′, v′ |= ϕ. The other direction is completely analogous.
2. This follows immediately from part 1 of this theorem and part 1 of Theorem 9.
3. Consider uniform models M and M′, a {K, [>]}-bisimulation Z, and (w,w′) ∈ Z. Now
consider an arbitrary ϕ ∈ L(K,Bc). Since M and M′ are uniform, Theorem 22 allows us
to systematically delete all occurences of conditional belief operators in ϕ, and replace them
with K- and [>]-operators, thus obtaining a formula ϕ> ∈ L(K, [>]) such that M |= ϕ↔ ϕ>
(†) and M′ |= ϕ↔ ϕ> (‡).8 Now we get
M, w |= ϕ ⇔ M, w |= ϕ> (†)
⇔ M′, w′ |= ϕ> (part 2 of this theorem)
⇔ M′, w′ |= ϕ (‡)
4. Assume that w and w′ are {K, [>]}-bisimilar; so there exists a {K, [>]}-bisimiluation
Z ⊆ W ×W ′ such that (w,w′) ∈ Z. Since the models are uniform, we get by part 3 of this
theorem thatM, w |= ϕ⇔M′, w′ |= ϕ for all ϕ ∈ L(K,Bc). Since the models are image-finite,
we get by Theorem 13 that w and w′ are {K,Bc}-bisimilar.
We finish this subsection by providing an overview of the first strategy to solve the main
issue of Section 3 (viz. finding a structural notion of bisimulation for conditional belief) and
evaluating its advantages and disadvantages.
This strategy has two components. The first component is to impose an extra condition
on epistemic plausibility models, viz. uniformity. We argued that this is relatively harmless,
since it can be given an intuitive motivation in terms of doxastic/epistemic introspection, and
because it is dynamically robust (cf. Theorems 17 and 18). The second component involves
what van Benthem calls “redesigning one’s language to fit more standard bisimulations” [6,
p. 310]. We introduced a new modality [>] and showed that together with knowledge, it can
define conditional belief (for uniform models) (cf. Theorems 21 and 22). We then used the
structural notion of {K, [>]}-bisimilarity to establish L(K,Bc)-equivalence and even {K,Bc}-
bisimilarity itself (cf. Theorem 24).
The main disadvantage of this approach lies in its second component: the [>]-operator
was introduced for the sole purpose of defining conditional belief (while maintaining a struc-
8Making this idea fully formal would require recursively defining a translation function τ : L(K,Bc) →
L(K, [>]), with as its key clause τ(Bαi ϕ) := Ki((α∧¬〈>i〉α)→ ϕ), and then proving that for uniform models
M, we have M |= ϕ↔ τ(ϕ).
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tural notion of bisimulation). In itself, however, it does not seem to have any intuitive
epistemic/doxastic reading.9 Therefore, this solution ends up looking a bit ad hoc.
4.2 Assuming connectedness
The second approach tries to keep the advantages of the first one, while avoiding its major
drawback, viz. the ad hoc introduction of new operators. The basic idea is that, with an extra
condition on the epistemic plausibility models, conditional belief can be reduced to knowledge
and safe belief. Hence, the B+-operator plays the role of the [>]-operator in the previous
approach, but unlike the [>]-operator, it does have an intuitive doxastic interpretation. The
extra condition on the models that we need is local connectedness:
Definition 25. An epistemic plausibility model M = 〈W, {∼i}i∈G, {≤i,w}w∈Wi∈G , V 〉 is called
locally connected iff for all agents i ∈ G and states w, v ∈ W it holds that if w ∼i v, then
w ≤i,w v or v ≤i,w w.
Whether this is a natural condition is a bit more doubtful than in the case of uniformity.
At least, local connectedness is dynamically robust:
Theorem 26. If an epistemic plausibility model M is locally connected, then so are M!ϕ and
M ⇑ ϕ.
Proof. Consider a locally connected modelM. We first treat the case of public announcement
of ϕ. Consider arbitrary states w, v of M!ϕ and suppose that w ∼!ϕi v. By Definition 3, we
get that w ∼i v. Since M is locally connected, it follows that w ≤i,w v or v ≤i,w w. Since
≤!ϕi,w =≤i,w (cf. Definition 3), we get that also w ≤!ϕi,w v or v ≤!ϕi,w w, as desired.
We now treat the case of radical upgrade with ϕ. Consider arbitrary states w, v of M ⇑ ϕ
and suppose that w ∼⇑ϕi v. By Definition 3, we get that w ∼i v. SinceM is locally connected,
it follows that w ≤i,w v or v ≤i,w w. We now make the following case distinction:
• M, w |= ϕ, M, v |= ϕ. Then by Definition 3, w ≤⇑ϕi,w v iff w ≤i,w v, and v ≤⇑ϕi,w w iff
v ≤i,w w. Since w ≤i,w v or v ≤i,w w, it follows that w ≤⇑ϕi,w v or v ≤⇑ϕi,w w, as required.
• M, w 6|= ϕ, M, v 6|= ϕ. Analogous to the previous case.
• M, w |= ϕ, M, v 6|= ϕ. Then by Definition 3, w ≤⇑ϕi,w v.
• M, w 6|= ϕ, M, v |= ϕ. Then by Definition 3, v ≤⇑ϕi,w w.
We now show that, when we require the models to be both uniform (cf. the previous
subsection) and locally connected, then conditional belief can be defined in terms of knowledge
and safe belief.10
Theorem 27. For all uniform and locally connected models M, it holds that M |= Bαi ϕ ↔(
Kˆiα→ Kˆi(α ∧B+i (α→ ϕ))
)
.
9Cf. “The intuitive meaning of these operators [such as [>], LD ] is not very clear, but they can be used to
define other interesting modalities, capturing various ‘doxastic attitudes’.”, [1, p. 32].
10A similar definition was already proposed in the context of modal conditional logics of normality;
cf. Boutilier[3, p. 104].
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Proof. Consider an arbitrary uniform and locally connected model M and a state w of M.
We will only work in the model M, and can therefore write x |= ψ instead of M, x |= ψ. We
prove both directions:
• w |= Bαi ϕ→
(
Kˆiα→ Kˆi(α ∧B+i (α→ ϕ))
)
Assume w |= Bαi ϕ and w |= Kˆiα; we show that w |= Kˆi(α ∧ B+i (α → ϕ)). Since w |=
Kˆiα, we have that [[α]]
M ∩ [w]∼i 6= ∅. By well-foundedness of ≤i,w, also Min≤i,w([[α]]M ∩
[w]∼i) 6= ∅. Therefore we can pick a state x ∈ Min≤i,w([[α]]M ∩ [w]∼i). Note that
w ∼i x and x |= α. Hence, if we can show that also x |= B+i (α → ϕ), then we get
w |= Kˆi(α ∧B+i (α→ ϕ)), as required.
We now prove that x |= B+i (α→ ϕ). Consider an arbitrary y ∈ [x]∼i and suppose that
y ≤i,x x and y |= α; we will show that y |= ϕ. Since w |= Bαi ϕ, it suffices to show that
y ∈ Min≤i,w([[α]]M ∩ [w]∼i).
We already know that y |= α and since y ∼i x and x ∼i w, also y ∼i w; hence
y ∈ [[α]]M ∩ [w]∼i . We now establish the ≤i,w-minimality of y in [[α]]M ∩ [w]∼i . Consider
an arbitrary z ∈ [[α]]M ∩ [w]∼i and suppose that z ≤i,w y; we show that y ≤i,w z. Since
y ≤i,x x and x ∼i w, we get by uniformity that y ≤i,w x. Together with z ≤i,w y, we
get z ≤i,w x. Since z ∈ [[α]]M ∩ [w]∼i and x is ≤i,w-minimal in [[α]]M ∩ [w]∼i , it follows
that x ≤i,w z. Together with y ≤i,w x, this implies that y ≤i,w z.
• w |= (Kˆiα→ Kˆi(α ∧B+i (α→ ϕ)))→ Bαi ϕ
Assume w |= Kˆiα → Kˆi(α ∧ B+i (α → ϕ)) (∗); we show that w |= Bαi ϕ. Consider
an arbitrary x ∈ Min≤i,w([[α]]M ∩ [w]∼i); we will show that x |= ϕ. Note that since
x ∈ [[α]]M ∩ [w]∼i , we have w |= Kˆiα, and thus by (∗) we get w |= Kˆi(α ∧B+i (α→ ϕ)).
Hence there is a state y ∈ [w]∼i such that y |= α and y |= B+i (α→ ϕ).
We now show that x ≤i,y y. Since x ∼i w and y ∼i w, we get that x ∼i y. Since M is
locally connected, it follows that x ≤i,y y or y ≤i,y x. In the first case, we’re done. Now
suppose that the second case obtains. Since y ∼i w, we get by uniformity that y ≤i,w x.
Since y ∈ [[α]]M ∩ [w]∼i and x is ≤i,w-minimal in [[α]]M ∩ [w]∼i , it follows that x ≤i,w y.
Again by uniformity, we get x ≤i,y y.
We have proved that x ≤i,y y. Also recall that x ∼i y. Hence, it follows from y |=
B+i (α→ ϕ) that x |= α→ ϕ. Since x |= α we get that x |= ϕ.
Using this definability result, we can now immediately prove the analogon of Theorem 24;
of course, since we did not have to introduce a new modality and a new notion of bisimulation
corresponding to it, we only reformulate its third and fourth part. The importance of this
is that when we restrict ourselves to the class of uniform and locally connected models, we
can get equivalence for conditional belief by means of a structural notion of bisimulation,
viz. {K,B+}-bisimulation. Furthermore, if we restrict to the uniform, locally connected
and image-finite models, then (structural) {K,B+}-bisimulation implies {K,Bc}-bisimilarity
(which involves universal quantification over formulas).
Theorem 28. Consider two epistemic plausiblity models M = 〈W, {∼i}i∈G, {≤i,w}w∈Wi∈G , V 〉
and M′ = 〈W ′, {∼′i}i∈G, {≤′i,w′}w
′∈W ′
i∈G , V
′〉, and a relation Z ⊆W ×W ′.
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1. If M and M′ are uniform and locally connected, and Z is a {K,B+}-bisimulation, then
for all ϕ ∈ L(K,B+, Bc) and for all (w,w′) ∈ Z, it holds that M, w |= ϕ⇔M′, w′ |= ϕ.
2. If M and M′ are uniform, locally connected and image-finite, then for any states w ∈W
and w′ ∈ W ′, we have that if w and w′ are {K,B+}-bisimilar, then they are {K,Bc}-
bisimilar as well.
Proof. 1. Consider uniform and locally connected models M and M′, a {K,B+}-bisimulation
Z, and (w,w′) ∈ Z. Now consider an arbitrary ϕ ∈ L(K,B+, Bc). Since M and M′ are
uniform and locally connected, Theorem 27 allows us to systematically delete all occurences of
conditional belief operators in ϕ, and replace them with K- and B+-operators, thus obtaining
a formula ϕ+ ∈ L(K,B+) such that M |= ϕ↔ ϕ+ (†) and M′ |= ϕ↔ ϕ+ (‡). Now we get
M, w |= ϕ ⇔ M, w |= ϕ+ (†)
⇔ M′, w′ |= ϕ+ (second part of Theorem 11)
⇔ M′, w′ |= ϕ (‡)
2. Assume that w and w′ are {K,B+}-bisimilar; so there exists a {K,B+}-bisimiluation
Z ⊆W ×W ′ such that (w,w′) ∈ Z. Since the models are uniform and locally connected, we
get by part 1 of this theorem that M, w |= ϕ ⇔ M′, w′ |= ϕ for all ϕ ∈ L(K,Bc). Since the
models are image-finite, we get by Theorem 13 that w and w′ are {K,Bc}-bisimilar.
Just as we did in the previous subsection, we now provide an overview of the second
strategy to solve the main issue of Section 3. This approach reduced conditional belief to
knowledge and safe belief, which are both intuitively clear epistemic/doxastic notions. There-
fore, the main issue of the first approach, viz. the ad hoc character of its introduction of the
[>]-operator, is avoided. In order to get the desired results about L(K,Bc)-equivalence and
{K,Bc}-bisimilarity (cf. Theorem 28), we required the epistemic plausibility models to be
not only uniform, but also locally connected. The uniformity constraint inherits of course all
of its justifications (intuitive epistemic/doxastic interpretation and dynamic robustness) from
the previous subsection. However, the new constraint, local connectedness, seems to be less
motivated: while it is also dynamically robust (cf. Theorem 26), it might not have as intuitive
an interpretation as the uniformity constraint.
5 Dynamics and bisimulation
In this section, we will make some remarks about the interaction between bisimulation and
dynamic model changes. First, however, we need to decide which approach to conditional be-
lief is to be adopted. Throughout this paper, we proposed three approaches: a non-structural
one in Section 3, and two structural ones in Section 4. We already argued extensively that the
structural approaches are to be preferred over the non-structural one. Of the two structural
approaches, however, none seemed to be highly preferable over the other. For reasons that
will become clear later, we will henceforth adopt the approach developed in Subsection 4.2.
However, one should keep in mind that this section could easily be rewritten in terms of the
approach developed in Subsection 4.1.
The main use of bisimulations is to prove L-equivalence of two models (for some lan-
guage L). Fact 5 tells us that adding the dynamic operators [!ϕ] and [⇑ ϕ] to the language
L(K,B+, Bc) does not increase its expressivity: using the reduction axioms, every formula
of the dynamic language L(K,B+, Bc, !,⇑) can be rewritten as an equivalent formula of the
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original static language L(K,B+, Bc). Thus, information about what will be the case after
some change has taken place can be pre-encoded in the static language. We will now combine
this pre-encoding strategy with Theorem 28:
Theorem 29. Consider two uniform and locally connected epistemic plausiblity modelsM =
〈W, {∼i}i∈G, {≤i,w}w∈Wi∈G , V 〉 and M′ = 〈W ′, {∼′i}i∈G, {≤′i,w′}w
′∈W ′
i∈G , V
′〉, states w ∈ W and
w′ ∈ W ′, and a {K,B+}-bisimulation Z ⊆ W ×W ′ such that (w,w′) ∈ Z. Furthermore,
consider an arbitrary formula ϕ ∈ L(K,B+, Bc); then:
1. If M, w |= ϕ and M′, w′ |= ϕ, then ∀ψ ∈ L(K,B+, Bc) :M!ϕ,w |= ψ ⇔M′!ϕ,w′ |= ψ.
2. ∀ψ ∈ L(K,B+, Bc) :M ⇑ ϕ,w |= ψ ⇔M′ ⇑ ϕ,w′ |= ψ.
Proof. 1. Consider an arbitrary ψ ∈ L(K,B+, Bc); hence [!ϕ]ψ ∈ L(K,B+, Bc, !,⇑). Using
Fact 5, we can find a formula ([!ϕ]ψ)s ∈ L(K,B+, Bc) that is equivalent to ψ. We now have:
M!ϕ,w |= ψ ⇔ M, w |= [!ϕ]ψ (since M, w |= ϕ)
⇔ M, w |= ([!ϕ]ψ)s
⇔ M′, w′ |= ([!ϕ]ψ)s (part 1 of Theorem 28)
⇔ M′, w′ |= [!ϕ]ψ)
⇔ M′!ϕ,w′ |= ψ (since M′, w′ |= ϕ)
The proof of 2. is analogous (or even easier, as we don’t have to worry about preconditions
anymore)
We finish by making two remarks. We proved the previous theorem by combining the
pre-encoding strategy and Theorem 28. Hence, if we would have adopted the first approach
to bisimulations for conditional belief (i.e. that developed in Subsection 4.1), we would have
needed reduction axioms for [!ϕ][>i]ψ and [⇑ ϕ][>i]ψ. These turn out to be almost identical
to those for safe belief.
Fact 30. The following are sound with respect to epistemic plausibility models:
[!ϕ][>i]ψ ↔ (ϕ→ [>i][!ϕ]ψ)
[⇑ ϕ][>i]ψ ↔
(
ϕ→ [>i](ϕ→ [⇑ ϕ]ψ)
)∧(¬ϕ→ ([>i](¬ϕ→ [⇑ ϕ]ψ) ∧Ki(ϕ→ [⇑ ϕ]ψ)))
The second remark is about the strength of bisimulation. Theorem 28 tells us that bisim-
ulation ‘now’ implies modal equivalence ‘now’. Theorem 29, however, tells us that bisim-
ulation ‘now’ implies modal equivalence ‘later ’ (i.e. after the model has undergone some
dynamic effects). Since both uniformity and local connectedness are dynamically robust
(cf. Theorems 18 and 26), Theorem 29 can be repeated to prove that the same holds for
any sequence of epistemic dynamics (e.g. if M, w and M′, w′ are {K,B+}-bisimilar, then
(((M!ϕ1) ⇑ ϕ2) ⇑ ϕ3)!ϕ4, w and (((M′!ϕ1) ⇑ ϕ2) ⇑ ϕ3)!ϕ4, w′ are L(K,B+, Bc)-equivalent —
provided they survive the public announcements, of course). Hence, if two epistemic plau-
sibility models are bisimilar at one point, then their entire epistemic-doxastic futures are
indistinguishable.
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6 Conclusion
The aim of this paper has been to explore the model theory of epistemic plausibility models,
which has been largely ignored in the present literature. We focused on the notion of bisimu-
lation, and proved various bisimulation-implies-equivalence type theorems, a Hennesy-Milner
type theorem, and two undefinability results. However, our main conclusion is a negative
one, viz. that bisimulations cannot straightforwardly be generalized to epistemic plausibility
models if conditional belief is taken into account. We presented and compared two different
ways of coping with this issue: adding a modality to the language, and putting extra con-
straints on the models. Finally, we established some results about the interaction between
bisimulation and dynamic model changes, and commented on the strength of bisimulation to
establish equivalence ‘now and in the future’.
As this is one of the first papers on the model theory of epistemic plausibility models,
there is obviously still much work to be done in this area. The main question asked in this
paper, viz. what is the right notion of bisimulation for conditional belief, has not yet received
a fully satisfactory answer. More work is needed on comparing the approaches developed in
this paper, but also on developing still other approaches that have thus far remained under
our radar. Finally, this paper has focused almost exclusively on the topic of bisimulation, but
one can also consider other topics from the model theory of modal logic, such as relations
with first-order logic (via the standard translation), and investigate whether/how they can
be generalized.
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